A PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF VALUE AND THE VARIABILITY OF VALUE JUDGMENTS

Abstract

Human beings are entities who make sense of their existence through values and position themselves according to certain principled orientations. In this context, the distinction between value and value judgment holds a decisive significance for philosophical analysis. While value itself exhibits a principled continuity and unity on the ontological level, value judgments may vary depending on historical, cultural, and individual conditions. Fundamental value categories such as the good, the beautiful, the true, and the useful emerge as the principal axes shaping both the intellectual and practical dimensions of human life. Nevertheless, the perceptions, interpretations, and forms of application related to these values may differ across various social and individual contexts. In particular, although the good is accepted as a singular and higher principle, judgments concerning what is good may display a variable character. Furthermore, the fact that individuals may theoretically know values but fail to act in accordance with them in practice reveals the tension between value and action. In this respect, the problem of value should be understood not merely as the acknowledgment of the existence of values, but as a fundamental philosophical inquiry into their source, formation, and ontological status in the face of changing value judgments.